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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
lower court is contained in the caption of the case upon appeal, 
with the exception of Summit County. Summit County was origi-
nally a defendant. The Complaint against Summit County was vol-
untarily dismissed by the plaintiff prior to trial. 
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(iii) 
STATEMENT OP JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and a final judgment entered following trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County. Jurisdiction is pre-
mised upon Utah Const. , Art. VIII, $ 3; Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2 
(1953); and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the lower court erred in denying to plaintiff 
Shirley Gillmor a private easement of access across the property 
of defendants to her own property for persons who had purchased 
permits to hunt big game there, and whether plaintiff is entitled 
to injunctive relief and damages. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
There is no constitutional provision or legislation 
believed to be determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was filed by Stephen Gillmor against the 
Wright defendants to establish a private easement of access for 
big game hunters on a road from Interstate 80 in Echo Canyon, 
across property owned by the Wrights, to property owned and 
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leased by Stephen Gillmor at the head of Sawmill Canyon, Summit 
County, Utah. In September, 1986, Judge Billings heard 
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order to enjoin 
interference by defendants with plaintiff's use of the road. 
Plaintiff's motion was denied. In September, 1987, Judge 
Wilkinson heard and denied plaintiff's motion for preliminary 
injunction. Charles Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor then 
intervened as defendants in the litigation and, in their counter-
claims alleged, among other things, a right to reform a decree of 
partition entered by the Third District Court in 1981 which par-
titioned the Sawmill Canyon property and other property among 
Charles Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Florence Gillmor, the 
last being Stephen Gillmor1s predecessor-in-interest. Stephen 
Gillmor passed away and was succeeded as plaintiff by his wife, 
Shirley Gillmor. The matter went to trial in September, 1988, on 
both the issue of the private easement of access originally 
raised by Stephen Gillmor, and on the issue of reformation of the 
partition decree. Judge Murphy entered findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and a judgment dismissing both Shirley Gillmor's 
complaint and the counterclaim of Edward Leslie and Charles F. 
Gillmor. This appeal is from Judge Murphy's dismissal of Shirley 
Gillmor's complaint. The findings and conclusions to which 
plaintiff t~*es exception are Finding of Fact No. 17 and 
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Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 8. (Addendum "C".) The 
defendants and intervenor-defendants have filed cross-appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit concerns real property owned by the par-
ties around Sawmill Canyon, Summit County, Utah. Sawmill Canyon 
is east of Echo, Utah on Interstate 80. The canyon contains an 
unimproved, dirt road which leaves the 1-80 frontage road and 
runs north, first crossing the property owned by the Wright 
defendants and then entering the property owned by the Gillmor 
parties. (See Map, Addendum "A".) 
Prior to 1982, the Gillmor Sawmill property, together 
with property elsewhere in the state, was owned by Florence 
Gillmor, Edward Leslie "Bud" Gillmor and Charles F. "Frank" 
Gillmor as tenants in common. In 1982, the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County entered an order which partitioned all of the 
Gillmor property, including the Sawmill property. (Finding of 
Fact No. 7.) The southern quarter of the Sawmill property was 
awarded to Frank Gillmor. The next quarter to the north was 
awarded to Bud Gillmor. The upper one-half of the property was 
awarded to Florence Gillmor. (See Map and Partition Decree, 
Exhibits IP and 2P.) 
-3-
*he •! u i n i I I i ..in /m i linjdiJ. I lii in L e a v e s t h e 1 3 " t r o n t a q e 
r o a d a n d t r a v e l s n o r t h a c r o s s t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e Wriijihi d e f e n -
d a n t s , t h e c r o p e r t ' t \\\ i i I irrn i t i |i n*-»i i , i w i i, 
a n d nn t o t h e p r o p e r t y awai J e d 1.1 I ' L u i a i i L e G i l l m u i , (I i n d i n g . : 
F a c t Mo, b , ) 
Bet wn- •'"in I In | in in l i: l I in rler" i s i cm
 (in Il I hi | mi i- »n I I i mi •', 
Florence G L l l m o r has conveyed her Sawmill Canyon property lo 
S t e p h e n G i 11 mo r a n d / o r S h i r 1 e y G i 1 1 m o i" , II' i i s w i I P , Stephen 
< j I I I iii 1 ^ i,i ,i» .I i, I ii I J j ii ii 1 ii1""11 1 1 1 1 1 mil iii 'j i i " 'i l i 11 II i il i II II II 11:> e q u e i n r. i \ „ i i i e 
Sawnu L1 Canyon property once owned by Florence Gillmor is now 
owned by Shirley Gi llmor or m e Estate of Stephen 'I , G i n m u r , «»m 
wh i. c 11 bh i i 1 e i i I 111 ' i, s the p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , ( P i rid I ng 
ot Fact No, 8 , ) 
T h e f'inii «'ri in in, II I I! | r c i j ' c" i ' ! \ i "i, 11 ! Ii "i .ii1", -ii t" i In IMI i n I ,i i in i , H I I |i'->' 
.and h a s I rad 11 icna 11 y been used lor ij razing l i v e s t o c k , T h e 
Gi llmor f a m i l y u » Il l line S a w m i l l C a n y o n Road h i s t o r i c a l l y t J 
o h ! i"» i in .j i in. "in ! I I i i i II I ni |, H I i ) » f r i i i h e iii line IIl| '"c , „ i Hi i i e i ' i ip I y e t , j 
i I i: !;ie i in g u e s t s , "II I j | J"J J Lhe road to transport an ;i to at tend 
t o 11 v e s t o c k, t o p e r f o r m m a i n t e n a n c e o r c o n s t r u c t i m p r o v e in, e n t s o n 
t h e i r emp 1 o y e e s a nd g ues t s P r I o r t • ::> 11 9 8 2 , 11 i e £ am, 11 y d I d n o t 
sell per m i t s t:„ o p e r s o i i, s t o a 11 o w 11 i e m t o I i u n t o i i 11 i e S a wm ill 
-4-
property, and did not use the Sawmill road for access for such 
persons. (Finding of Fact No. 10.) 
The Sawmill Canyon Road has historically carried a 
variety of vehicles, including trucks, sheep camps, heavy equip-
ment and recreational vehicles, and has been travelled by persons 
in vehicles, on foot and on horseback. (Id.) 
In 1982, Stephen Gillmor, as the lessee of the property 
of Florence Gillmor and Frank Gillmor, began to sell permits to 
individuals to hunt on the Florence and Frank Gillmor property in 
Sawmill Canyon. (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 32; Finding of Fact No. 11.) 
At the same time, defendant Dennis Wright first informed Stephen 
Gillmor and his permitted hunters that they could not cross the 
Wright property on the Sawmill road to obtain access to the 
Gillmor Sawmill property for hunting. (Id.; Finding of Fact No. 
12.) 
In the fall of 1986, Stephen Gillmor filed this action 
against the Wright defendants to enjoin their interference with 
his use of the Sawmill road as access for hunters. Shortly 
thereafter, a hearing was held on plaintifffs application for a 
1
 References to transcripts will be as follows: the hearing 
on plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order will be 
"Tr. 9/30/86"; the hearing on plaintiffs motion for preliminary 
injunction will be "Tr. 9/25/87"; the hearing on plaintiff's 
motion to amend judgment will be "Tr. 9/30/87"; and the trial 
will be "Tr. 9/20/88". 
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In the fall of 1987, Stephen Gillmor moved for a pre-
liminary injunction to halt interference with his use of the 
road. A one-day evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Homer 
Wilkinson on September 25, 1987. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, Judge Wilkinson ruled that plaintiff had a right to use the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for any purpose for which it was lawfully 
used prior to its abandonment by Summit County in December, 1986. 
(Tr. 9/25/87, p. 252.) The judge ruled that such legal use did 
not include hunting by permittees because that practice violated 
the Summit County zoning ordinance. (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 253.) The 
court's decision was based upon (Tr. 9/30/87, p. 53) the testi-
mony of Jerry Smith, Director of the Summit County Planning and 
Building Department (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 190, et seq.), who testified 
about the zoning implications of a cabin Stephen Gillmor had 
built on his property in 1987, (Id. at p. 196) after the County's 
abandonment of the road. (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 45.) 
The matter was tried to the court, Judge Michael Murphy 
presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988. Judge Murphy issued a 
written opinion entitled "Summary Decision" in which he indicated 
that he agreed with plaintiff's position, but that he felt con-
strained to abide by the opinion of Judge Wilkinson in deference 
to the law of the case doctrine. (Summary Decision, pp. 7-8.) 
Judge Murphy did find, however, that plaintiff had suffered 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL DECLARA-
TION THAT SHE IS THE OWNER OF A PRIVATE 
EASEMENT ACROSS THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD AS A 
MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE GILLMOR SAWMILL 
PROPERTY. 
A. A Landowner Whose Property Abuts a Public Road 
Possesses, by Operation of Lawf a Private Easement of Access to 
and From Her Property Across the Road, Which Survives Any Aban-
donment of the Public Riqht-of-Way. 
The trial court found, and defendants do not dispute, 
that plaintiff is a property owner whose property adjoined the 
Sawmill Canyon Road when it was a public road, and who now 
continues to own the property since the road was abandoned. 
(Findings of Fact No. 1, 5, 9, 14.) 
Under Utah law, as well as under the law of other 
jurisdictions, a landowner whose property abuts a public road, 
possesses, by operation of law, a private easement of access to 
his property across the public road. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 
656 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah 1982); Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. 
State, Road Commission, 533 P.2d 882, 883 (Utah 1975); accord 
Lower Payette Ditch Co. v. Smith, 254 P.2d 417, 420 (Idaho 1953). 
A subsequent abandonment of the public right-of-way over such a 
road has no effect on the private easement owned by an abutting 
landowner. See Mason, supra, 656 P.2d at 468-69; Hague v. Juab 
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County Mill & Elevator Co,, 107 P. 249, 252 (Utah 1910); see also 
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-102.5 (1953 Repl. Vol. 1984 Ed.). 
The Mason case appears to be the Utah Supreme Court's 
most recent pronouncement on the subject of an abutting 
landowner's right of access over an abandoned public road. In 
Mason, the plaintiff had conveyed to the State in 1951 by war-
ranty deed a strip of land which ran through a larger parcel 
owned by plaintiff. Thereafter, a highway was constructed across 
the strip owned by the State, In 1976, after a new freeway was 
constructed nearby, the State abandoned the old highway, and 
informed the plaintiff that if he did not buy the strip of land 
for $3,675, it would be sold to a third person. The plaintiff 
paid the sum to the State under protest. At approximately the 
same time, the State tore up and destroyed portions of the 
abandoned highway. 
Plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the 
State seeking, inter alia, a judgment requiring the State to 
restore the portions of the abandoned highway that had been 
impaired, torn up, or blocked, on the basis of the plaintiff's 
right of access as an abutting landowner. On appeal from the 
trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims, the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed, stating as follows: 
Except where changed by statutes per-
taining to limited access highways, . . . an 
abutting landowner has a private easement of 
-10-
ingress and egress to existing public 
highways. 
This private easement of access has been 
held to survive the abandonment or vacation 
of the public highway. 
656 P.2d at 468 (citations omitted). Similarly, in the present 
case, plaintiff, as the owner of property abutting the Sawmill 
Canyon Road, has a private easement of access over the road, 
which survives Summit County's abandonment of the pubic 
right-of-way over the road. 
B. Plaint ifffs Easement of Access Permits Access by 
Hunters. 
Judge Wilkinson ruled on plaintiff's motion for a 
preliminary injunction that any lawful use of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road up to the time of its abandonment in December, 1986 was an 
appropriate use. Judge Wilkinson then went on to rule that 
plaintiff's use of the property for hunting was not a lawful 
2 
activity because it violated the Summit County zoning ordinance 
and, therefore, use of the road for that purpose could not be 
considered for purposes of establishing the permissible use of 
2 Plaintiff disagrees with the lower court's ruling that hunt-
ing, as conducted by Stephen Gillmor on the property prior to 
December, 1986, violated applicable zoning laws. Because use of 
the road after abandonment is determined by use of the road prior 
to abandonment, and not use of the property, plaintiff will not 
include in this brief argument on the interpretation of the zon-
ing ordinance. 
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the road after abandonment, (Tr. 9/25/87, p. 253.) Judge 
Wilkinson was in error in his holding, basing it upon a misappli-
cation of the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Hague v. Juab 
County Mill & Elevator Co., 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910) and Mason v. 
State, supra. 
Judge Michael Murphy disagreed with Judge Wilkinson. 
Judge Murphy said, in his Summary Decision (Addendum "B"): 
It is clear that Judge Wilkinson's 
interpretation and application of Hague v. 
Juab County Mill & Elevator Co., 107 P. 249 
(Utah 1910) and Mason v. State. 656 P.2d 465 
(Utah 1982) differs with the views heretofore 
expressed in this Summary Decision. Judge 
Wilkinson's views also suggest that the 
purposes for which access is sought determine 
whether access is to be allowed. (P.I. tr., 
p. 253, In. 13-15, 22-24). This Summary 
Decision, however, indicates that a destina-
tion purpose does not taint one's use of an 
easement or right-of-way as long as that use 
is not a different or greater burden on the 
servient estate. The law of the case doc-
trine, however, dictates that Judge 
Wilkinson's interpretations and application 
prevail. 
(Summary Decision at p. 7.) 
Judge Wilkinson's decision was in error for several 
reasons. First, his decision that hunting, as conducted by 
Stephen Gillmor, constituted an illegal use of the property was 
based upon testimony surrounding the construction of a cabin by 
Mr. Gillmor. The line of questioning that concerned the issue 
was directed to Jerry Smith, the Director of the Summit County 
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Planning and Building Department, who was asked about a building 
permit Mr. Gillmor had obtained when he constructed the cabin. 
(See Tr. 9/25/87, pp. 191-195.) The cabin was not constructed 
until 1987. The county abandoned the Sawmill Canyon Road in 
December, 1986. The correct inquiry is to the use of the road 
prior to its abandonment. Events occurring after the abandonment 
are immaterial. Judge Wilkinson himself recognized the error in 
the hearing on plaintiff's motion to amend judgment when he said, 
"I do think [plaintiff's] argument is well taken when he argues 
that what happened after December 26th of '86 is irrelevant and 
the building of the house and the—and so forth on there." (Tr. 
9/30/87, p. 55.) 
Additionally, Judge Wilkinson's decision was based upon 
a misunderstanding of the Hague and Mason opinions. Those cases 
do not stand for the proposition that the use of the abutting 
property is pertinent to the use of the road after abandonment, 
and they do not support Judge Wilkinson's conclusion that unlaw-
ful activities on the property render use of the road for access 
unlawful and, therefore, impermissible. In Mason v. State, 
supra, discussed above, plaintiff owned a piece of property which 
was bisected by a public highway. The highway was eventually 
abandoned and torn up, and plaintiff sued to obtain, among other 
things, a judgment requiring the state to restore the highway. 
-13-
The Utah Supreme Court remanded to the lower court to take 
additional evidence, but held that the abutting property owner 
has an easement over the abandoned highway to the extent it is 
necessary for ingress and egress to and from the property. No 
mention whatsoever was made by the court of the reason for which 
the property owner might be travelling over the abandoned high-
way, or of the use to which he would put his property when he 
arrived there. 
The Mason opinion cited the decision in Hague v. Juab 
County Mill & Elevator Co,, 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910). In Hague, 
plaintiff owned property which fronted on a public road. The 
road was subsequently abandoned. Defendant maintained a ditch 
between plaintiff's property and the road. Defendant modified 
its ditch so that plaintiff could no longer cross from the street 
to his property and plaintiff sued to enjoin operation of the 
ditch in any way which interfered with his access. The lower 
court's award of an injunction to plaintiff was upheld. In the 
process, the court explained that the property owner was entitled 
to a reasonably convenient passage way from his premises to the 
road. By the same token, said the court, plaintiff could not 
prevent defendant from using the ditch for the purposes for which 
it was constructed and used prior to the commencement of the 
litigation. The extent of defendant's rights to use the ditch, 
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however, are not unlimited, said the court. If the banks and 
sides of the ditch were maintained in the street at a certain 
width and height during all of the years that the ditch has been 
used by defendant, it may not, for its own convenience, change 
the channel, if such change interferes with the rights of others. 
(Id. at p. 251.) 
Neither Hague nor Mason considers in any way the use of 
the property to determine the use of the road. Finally, neither 
case restricted the use of the road after abandonment to the same 
type of use made before abandonment. That concept was discussed 
only in the Hague case and then only with respect to what activi-
ties were permissible by defendant if it appeared they would 
interfere with plaintiff1s right of access over the abandoned 
road. In short, Hague and Mason establish the law in this state 
to be that Shirley Gillmor, in this case, may continue to use the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for any purpose whatsoever to obtain access 
to her property, including access for hunters. 
Even if the use of the road is to be restricted to the 
same type of use made prior to abandonment, Shirley Gillmor1s use 
is permissible. The Sawmill Canyon Road has historically been 
used to obtain access to the property by persons travelling on 
foot, on horseback and by a variety of vehicles, including 
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles. 
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(Finding of Fact No. 10; Tr. 9/25/87, pp. 29-30, 170-172.) 
During the years 1982 through 1986, those persons who travelled 
on the Sawmill Canyon Road in order to exercise hunting rights on 
the Stephen Gillmor property travelled there primarily by trucks 
and recreational vehicles. (Finding of Fact No. 11; Tr. 9/25/87, 
p. 44.) The trial court specifically found that while there was 
minimal evidence of road damage by hunters, there is realisti-
cally no difference in the nature of the use of the road itself, 
whether the ultimate use of the various parcels is for commercial 
hunting, grazing or both. (Finding of Fact No. 18.) Addition-
ally, the court found that, while there was also some minimal 
evidence that hunters are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle 
and sheep, there was no sufficient showing that hunters1 use of 
the road interfered with the abutting owners1 use of, or access 
to, their land. (Finding of Fact No. 19.) 
Assuming the use of the road is not altered in a 
significant way, there is a good reason why a change in the use 
of the property should not preclude use of the road. If the rule 
were so, the use of the property could never be altered to 
achieve its highest and best use over time. With respect to the 
Shirley Gillmor property, for example, Stephen Gillmor had 
determined that it is possible to supplement his ranching income 
with income from the sale of hunting permits through an activity 
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that is entirely consistent with agricultural operations and 
which allowed him to make more complete use of the land. The law 
should encourage landowners to realize the potential of their 
land, and not to restrict its use unnecessarily, 
II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT INJUNC-
TION AND DAMAGES. 
Beginning in 1982, the Wright defendants prevented the 
plaintiff's use of the road for access by hunters. Those defen-
dants have indicated they intend to continue to prevent plaintiff 
from using the road for access by hunters. (Tr. 9/25/87, pp. 
174-175.) Under the circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to a 
permanent injunction enjoining any interference by the Wright 
defendants with plaintiff's use of the road for access by 
hunters. 
Plaintiff is also entitled to damages for past inter-
ference. The evidence was uncontroverted that plaintiff suffered 
$10,940.00 in damages in the form of revenues that were lost from 
hunters who had made reservations to hunt on the property, and in 
fees that had to be paid to an adjoining landowner to temporarily 
obtain alternative access to the property. (Finding of Fact No. 
20; Exhibit 42; Tr. 9/20/88, pp. 9-10.) Plaintiff is entitled to 
a judgment for that sum against the Wright defendants. 
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CONCLUSION 
Shirley Gillmor requests that this Court reverse the 
judgment of the lower court and instruct that the lower court 
enter judgment in favor of plaintiff declaring that plaintiff 
enjoys a private easement of access on the Sawmill Canyon Road 
for herself, permittees, invitees and licensees for all purposes, 
including access for hunting; that the court issue a permanent 
injunction enjoining defendants1 interference with plaintiff's 
use of the Sawmill Canyon Road; and that the lower court enter 
judgment in favor of plaintiff against the Wright defendants for 
money damages in the sum of $10,940.00. 
DATED this day of AJO \Jts*^\*tsf, 1989. 
JAMESsjyLEE 
JOHN B. WILSON 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE J. GILLMOR and 
SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as the 
personal representative of the 
Estate Of STEPHEN T. GILLMOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C. 
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT, 
RONA R. WRIGHT and SUMMIT 
COUNTY, a body politic, 
Defendants, 
vs. 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR and 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, 
Intervenor-Defendants. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 9067 
Following trial, the court took t-his matter under advisement 
and is now prepared to issue its decision. This Summary Decision 
is not a substitute for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
but is intended to provide the parties with an explication of the 
reasons for the court's decision. As a consequence, no attempt 
will even be made to recite the history of this and other related 
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litigation.1 That history, recounting these parties1 odyssey 
from court to court and judge to judge, could compete with the 
best known works of Homer in intricacy, length and author's time. 
Without even considering the other cases in which most of 
these parties have participated, this case alone has consumed 
substantial court resources. The two day trial on September 20 
and 21, 1988 was the third annual evidentiary hearing in this 
particular litigation. Following trial, the court was required 
to review the transcripts and understand the two previous 
evidentiary hearings. Furthermore, the court was obligated to 
fully consider and understand the partition litigation which was 
tried before Judge Leary in 1977 and again in 1980. To the 
uninitiated, such as this court per Judge Murphy, these tasks 
were not insubstantial. As a consequence, these parties cannot 
expect a speedy decision and do not have any right to claim 
priority over those members of the public whose causes were 
submitted following the trial of this case.2 Moreover, these 
parties should be expected to live with and abide by the 
^hese and related disputes have been to the Supreme Court 
twice, the Court of Appeals once and before district Judges Hall, 
Leary, Frederick, Billings, Wilkinson and now Murphy. ^  A further 
voyage on appeal of a judgment based on this decision is likely. 
2The court was not pressed to resolve this case so that the 
seasonal rights asserted could immediately be exercised. The 
deer and elk hunting season was virtually upon the parties when 
the matter was tried. Thus, the earliest time for exercise of 
disputed rights is Spring, 1989 when grazing might occur. 
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decisions and orders of the various courts and judges whose time 
they have liberally consumed and whose jurisdiction they have 
freely invoked. 
The issues presented for final resolution before this court 
at this time are twofold: 
1. Is the plaintiff entitled to use the Sawmill 
Canyon Road in furtherance of a commercial hunting 
operation on abutting land? 
2. Are the intervenor-defendants entitled to use 
the Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintifffs land for 
livestock access to the eastern portion of their own 
land? 
I PLAINTIFFS1 USE OF ROAD 
Plaintiff seeks to use Sawmill Canyon Road for access to run 
a commercial hunting enterprise on its property Defendants and 
intervenor-defendants oppose such use on the grounds that it is 
limited to ranching access, would expand the historical use of 
the road and interfere with the historical use of the abutting 
owners' land. 
The record is clear that there was no actual or attempted 
commercial hunting on the parcels in question prior to 1982. 
While there was some minimal evidence of road damage by hunters, 
there is realistically no difference in the nature of the use of 
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the road itself whether the ultimate use of the various parcels 
is for commercial hunting, grazing or both. There was also some 
minimal evidence that hunters are bothersome at times to 
ranchers, cattle and sheep but there was no sufficient showing 
that hunters1 use of the road interfered with the abutting 
owners' use of or access to their land. 
Essentially, defendants' position seeks to limit both 
plaintiff's use of abutting land and the access road. Hague v. 
Juab County Mill & Elevator Co., 107 P. 249 (Utah 1910) is 
inapposite and is not authority to limit plaintiff's use of the 
road based on what use it intends to put the abutting land. In 
Hague the new use placed a greater burden on the street. In the 
instant case there is no real difference in the use of the road 
by hunters or ranchers; only their objectives, once access is 
accomplished, are different. In the Hague case the increased 
burden on the street interfered with the abutting owner's access 
to his own land. In the instant case, there is insufficient 
evidence that hunters' use of the road interferes with 
defendants' use of the road. Finally, in Hague there was no 
objection to what Juab Mill and Electric did on their fee land. 
In this case, however, defendants essentially seek to limit the 
plaintiff's use of its abutting land once access is accomplished. 
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Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982), is equally 
inapposite. In Mason the Court was concerned with defendant's 
interference with reasonable access to plaintiff's abutting land* 
There is insufficient evidence before this court, however, to 
establish that hunters' use of the road will interfere with 
defendants' access to their abutting land. 
The applicability of the above factual determinations and 
interpretations of law 11 the final decision in this case are 
affected by earlier proceedings. All proceedings in this 
litigation before this court are an integrated whole. The law of 
the case doctrine limits a successor judge and renders many of 
the rulings of predecessor judges binding upon the parties as 
long as this court retains jurisdietion, The expressed 
underpinning of the doctrine is delay avoidance. The unexpressed 
underpinnings are public confidence in the integrity of court 
decisions, the proposition that different personifications of the 
same court do not affect its interpretations, and the fundamental 
precept that ours is a government of laws, not men. The law of 
the case doctrine has particular applicability to district court 
proceedings in Summit County where individual calendaring is not 
utilized and judges are rotated semiannually. Consequently, it 
is necessary to analyze the decisions of predecessor judges in 
this case. 
GILLMOR V. WRIGHT PAGE SIX SUMMARY DECISION 
The law of the case doctrine has little applicability to the 
denial of plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. 
The TRO proceedings did not involve an interpretation of 
substantive law. Plaintiff's motion was denied in September, 
1986 by Judge Judith Billings for want of irreparable injury. 
Plaintiff now seeks damages and a permanent injunction which 
would interdict accrual of further damages. 
In the TRO proceedings it was assumed that the extent of all 
parties right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road was dictated by 
their respective unchallenged prior use. Following denial of 
plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, however, it 
was determined and stipulated that the Sawmill Canyon Road had 
been adjudicated to be a public road. Consequently, the Wright 
defendants temporarily ceased interfering with plaintiff's use of 
the road and undertook to have Summit County abandon the road as 
a public way. This the County did in December, 1986 and 
defendants resumed their interference with plaintiff's use of 
Sawmill Canyon Road for hunting access. 
The September, 1987 proceedings before Judge Homer Wilkinson 
on plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Junction, while again 
considering relief pendente lite, did involve interpretations of 
substantive law. Consequently, this court must now determine 
exactly what was decided and the applicability of the law of the 
case doctrine to such decision. Because there appears to have 
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been no entry of formal, written Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, resort must be made to the transcripts of the hearing on 
plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and the hearing on 
plaintiff's motion to reconsider findings and conclusions.3 
Following a one day trial on plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Judge Wilkinson ruled that any lawful use 
of Sawmill Canyon Road up to the time of Its abandonment in 
December, 1986 was an appropriate use. Judge Wilkinson further 
ruled that plaintiff's proposed use for hunting access following 
the abandonment was an expansion of prior use and was not a 
lawful use. (P.I. tr. p.252, In. 16 to p. 253, In. 18; p. 254 
In. 1-7; p. 255, In. 14-21). 
It is clear that Judge Wilkinson's interpretation and 
application of Hague v. Juab County Mill & Elevator Co. . 107 P. 
249 (Utah 1910) and Mason v. State, 656 P 2d 465 (Utah 1982) 
differs with the views heretofore expressed in this Summary 
Decision. Judge Wilkinson's views also suggest that the purposes 
for which access is sought determine whether access is to be 
allowed. (P.I. tr., p. 253, In. 13-15, 22-24). This Summary 
Decision, however, indicates that a destination purpose does not 
taint one's use of an easement or. tight of way as long as that 
use is not a different or greater burden on the servient estate. 
JThese transcripts will be referenced as "P.I. tr. p. , 
In. M and "Rule 59 tr., p. , In. , " respectively. 
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The law of the case doctrine, however, dictates that Judge 
Wilkinson's interpretations and application prevail.4 
Immediately following Judge Wilkinson's ruling, plaintiff 
filed a motion seeking reconsideration of his ruling in light of 
newly proffered evidence. That new evidence was composed of two 
letters from the Summit County Attorney, one to the director of 
the Planning Commission, a witness before Judge Wilkinson, and 
the other to Stephen Gillmor, whose estate is now the plaintiff. 
Judge Wilkinson did not receive the new evidence and refused to 
consider the zoning ordinance. (Rule 59 tr., pp. 52-56). The 
court ruled that, considering only activities prior to 198 6 
(sic), plaintiff's use of its property violated zoning 
ordinances. (Rule 59 tr., p. 60, In. 6-20). 
At the 1988 hearing the previously rejected letters of the 
Summit County Attorney, Exhibits 40 and 41, were received. 
Additionally, the court received Exhibit 39, a March 8, 1988 
letter from the Summit County Planning Commission to plaintiff's 
counsel determining that a commercial hunting operation was a 
permitted use on property zoned AG-1, which was the 
categorization of plaintiff's abutting land. Finally, the court 
received the Development Code of Summit County, Exhibit 38. The 
'while Judge Wilkinson's ruling is in part couched in the 
preliminary injunction lexicon of probability of success, he did 
make the referenced rulings of law to which the law of the case 
doctrine applies. 
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above-referenced pieces of evidence constitute the only 
significant new liability evidence in plaintiff's case-in-chief 
which had not previously been considered by Judges Billings and 
Wilkinson. This court, then, must consider whether such evidence 
would change the outcome by establishing that commercial hunting 
was a lawful use prior to 1987.5 
The letters from the Summit County Attorney, Exhibits 40 and 
41, are not particularly helpful. The Development Code, Exhibit 
38, is the most helpful in determining what was allowed under 
what conditions in an AG-1 area, such as those abutting the 
Sawmill Canyon Road. Section 12.20 describes authorized uses in 
all zones and provides that a particular use is not allowed in 
two situations: (1) the use is not specified in the accompanying 
listing; or (2) is specified but indicated by the signal fl ." 
In the accompanying list, there is no specific reference to 
hunting and use Nos. (4), (5)B., (5)C, an (7)D., are the only 
categories which could be inclusive of commercial hunting. Two 
of these categories are conditional uses and two are forbidden 
uses. There is no evidence that at any time in or before 1986 a 
permit for conditional use was issued to plaintiffs. Therefore, 
it would appear that commercial hunting was not a lawful use 
prior to 1987. 
bWhile Judge Wilkinson premised his ruling on pre-1986 use 
(Rule 59 tr., p. 60, In. 6-20), it is clear that he merely 
intended to exclude consideration of plaintiff's 1987 conduct of 
constructing a cabin. 
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Exhibit 39 constitutes a March 8, 1988 recitation of an 
interpretation of the Development Code which is contrary to this 
court's interpretation. Exhibit 39 opines that commercial 
hunting in the form of sale of permits in an AG-1 is a permitted 
use. Section 12.21(4) of the Development Code, however, suggests 
by its use of the word "hereafter" that determinations such as 
Exhibit 39 are prospective only. Such a determination in 1988 
would therefore not render lawful an otherwise unlawful pre-1988 
use.6 There is, then, no new evidence before the court to 
support plaintiffs claim for relief. The court, however, 
readily concedes that little focus was had on the interpretation 
of the Development Code and the determination of the Summit 
County Planning Commission in Exhibit 39. Consequently, without 
encouraging the same, the court would entertain argument on 
reconsideration of this portion of the Summary Decision. 
II. INTERVENORS1 GRAZING ACCESS 
The Judgment and Decree of Partition purports to be a full 
and complete resolution of the relative property rights of the 
plaintiffs and intervenors. In affirming the judgment, the Utah 
Supreme Court delineated factors that remain pertinent to this 
^Plaintiff has also asserted a damage claim for interference 
with access. Even if the Exhibit 39 determination^ was 
retrospective, the court is not certain that damages in addition 
to injunctive relief would be appropriate. 
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renewed dispute. The Court acknowledged that historical uses are 
not sacrosanct in partition cases and that Edward Gillmor's 
ranching activities would in fact be affected and curtailed. 
Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 740-41 (Utah 1982). The Court 
further indicated it was appropriate that "preservation of 
suitable grazing lands" not be the primary consideration of the 
partitioning court. Id.. at 741. Finally, the Court expressly 
accepted the consequence that "the land as partitioned may be 
less usable for grazing" and suggested that grazing be effected 
by leases among the parties. 13. It is in the context of these 
remarks and the Court's ultimate affirmance of the judgment that 
this court must consider the interveners' efforts under Rule 
60(b) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to be relieved from the 
judgment. 
Specifically, intervenors seek access over the parcels 
awarded to plaintiff in order to graze stock on the eastern 
portion of parcels awarded them. In order to allow such access 
this court would have to relieve the intervenors of the final 
judgment in the partition action and amend the partition decree. 
In addition to being presented with testimonial evidence, 
the court inspected the premises, traversed in a four-wheel drive 
vehicle the length of Sawmill Canyon Road, viewed each end of 35 
Canyon and walked the length of Pine Canyon. This evidence 
persuaded the court that intervenors do not have traditional 
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grazing access to the eastern portions of their own parcels 
unless they are allowed access over the parcels awarded 
plaintiff. 
35 Canyon is not accessible for grazing from the south. 
Consequently, access over interveners' own land to eastern 
portions must be through Pine Canyon. Stock in limited numbers 
and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill Canyon Road 
through Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area. Moving the 
stock back down Pine Canyon is even more limited, difficult and 
treacherous. Herding stock through Pine Canyon, then, does not 
constitute traditional grazing access. This is consistent with 
the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second partition trial. 
Mr. Huffman did not even consider Pine Canyon for access. 
Additionally, earth moving equipment cannot create a stock trail 
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access. The evidence 
did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be 
moved the length of the Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's 
parcels to the eastern portions of intervenors' parcels in less 
than a full day. 
Intervenors have presented argument suggesting 
inconsistencies in the evidence and underlying Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment and Decree of Partition. 
This court has considered each of these arguments but views the 
alleged inconsistences as mere incongruities. Suffice it to say 
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that the record as a whole does not indicate an intent by the 
court in the partition action to provide intervenors access over 
plaintiff1s awarded parcels• Furthermore, the transcript 
indicates that the difficulty of access to the eastern portions 
of the parcels was addressed in testimony before Judge Leary in 
the partition trial. 
This case presents a situation where the alleged mistake, if 
any, could have and should have been corrected in the partition 
trial. Intervenors point to Exhibit 113-D7 in the partition 
action as the genesis of the mistake. This document, however, 
was actually offered and sponsored by intervenor Charles Gillmor. 
Furthermore, intervenor Edward Gillmor failed to review Exhibit 
133-D and move to strike as he was expressly cautioned to do. 
All parties had the opportunity to and did in fact elaborately 
review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Decree of Partition. 
Under such circumstances, it would be inappropriate and 
unwise to invoke the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(7) to grant 
relief from the final judgment. This is a case where the 
finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight 
years after its entry and six years after its affirmance in 
response to assertions which suggest at the most "mistake, 
'Exhibit 46-D in this action. 
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inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect*w See, Rule 
60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This particular case 
indicates the danger of undermining final judgments. Courts 
should not provide inspiration to these parties to continue 
litigating the partition case ad infinitum. Instead, these 
parties should accept the decisions rendered, heed the admonition 
of the Utah Supreme Court and effectuate traditional grazing 
access "by leasing from one another." 657 P.2d at 741. 
Intervenors suggest that the Judgment and Decree of 
Partition is no impediment to an order of this court granting an 
easement by implication or necessity. Such an order, however, 
would violate traditional notions of finality inherent in the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Given these parties1 proclivity to invoke the jurisdiction 
of courts, it is not surprising that, as their continuing 
disputes age in the courts, the doctrines of the law of the case, 
finality of judgments and res judicata come into play. This case 
and these disputes illustrate the fundamental wisdom inherent in 
such doctrines. The application of these doctrines in this case 
leaves these parties as they were found and requires them to live 
with the decisions of the courts whose jurisdiction they have so 
freely invoked. If the parties must resort to the courts to 
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resolve their disputes, then they must adhere to and respect the 
integrity of the decisions of those courts. 
For the foregoing reasons, the court determines that 
plaintiff's Complaint and interveners1 Counterclaims should be 
dismissed, each party to bear its own costs. Plaintiff should 
prepare a draft of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
submit the same to defendants and intervenors for inclusion of 
matters pertinent to the issues upon which they prevailed. The 
court fully realizes that certain of its factual resolutions in 
this Summary Decision might provide fodder for appeal. These 
factual resolutions, however, do not dictate the result in this 
court. In the event a reviewing court chooses to reverse this 
court's judgment, those factual resolutions will avert the 
necessity of a new trial. The court expects to be presented with 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approved as to form by 
all parties. 
For judicial economy and other obvious reasons, the court 
intends to forward this Summary Decision to the presiding judge 
and suggest that he permanently reassign this case and any 
further proceedings in the partition action to Judge Murphy 
pursuant to this court's inherent power. 
Dated this 28th day of November, 1988. 
j^U 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CHARLES F. GILLMOR, 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, 
Intervenor-Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came on for trial to the Court, Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988. This 
matter had earlier come on for evidentiary hearings before 
Honorable Judith M. Billings on plaintiff's motion for temporary 
restraining order, September 30, 1986, and before Honorable Homer 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9067 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Wilkinson on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, 
September 25, 1987. Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor was present at 
trial and represented by James B. Lee and John B. Wilson of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Defendant Dennis K. Wright was present 
and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates. 
Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor was present and 
represented by R. Stephen Marshall of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy. Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor was present 
and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates. The 
Court observed and heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed 
the exhibits submitted by the parties, and reviewed the trial 
memoranda submitted by the parties. The Court reviewed portions 
designated by the parties of the transcripts of the hearings on 
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiff's 
motion for preliminary injunction and plaintiff's motion to amend 
the judgment on her motion for preliminary injunction. The Court 
reviewed selected transcripts designated by the parties from the 
trial of the "partition case", Edward Leslie Gillmor, et al.y v. 
Florence Gillmor, et al. , Salt Lake County Third District Civil 
No. 223998, as well as selected exhibits from the partition case 
and the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on the appeal of the 
same case, reported at 657 P.2d 736 (Utah 1982). The Court 
travelled in a vehicle the length of the Sawmill Canyon road from 
the 1-80 frontage road to the property of Shirley Gillmor. The 
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Court continued in a vehicle to the southeast portion of the 
Sawmill property owned by Shirley Gillmor* The Court walked the 
length of Pine Canyon- The Court viewed each end of 35 Canyon. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, and 
good cause appearing therefor, now hereby makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor is the owner of certain 
real property located in Summit County, Utah and more particu-
larly described as follows: 
The south 112.0 acres of Section 21, the 
south 112.0 acres of Section 22, the south 
111.0 acres of that portion of Section 23 
owned by Gillmors, the north 316.46 acres of 
Section 26, the north 316.46 acres of Section 
27, the north 316.54 acres of Section 28 less 
the northeast quarter of the northeast 
quarter, total net 276.46 acres, and the 
southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of 
Sections 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
1284.58 acres. 
• * * 
The north 528 acres of Section 21, the 
north 528 acres of Section 22, the north 229 
acres of that portion of Section 23 owned by 
Gillmors, T4N, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1285 
acres. 
The property owned by Shirley Gillmor as described herein is the 
northern one-half of a larger parcel of property commonly known 
as the "Gillmor Sawmill Property". 
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2. Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor is the 
owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in 
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
The south 323-54 acres of Section 26, 
the south 323-54 acres of Section 27, the 
south 323.54 acres of Section 28, the north 
63 acres of the east half of Section 33, the 
north 125-49 acres of Section 34 and the 
north 125.51 acres of Section 35, T4N, R5E, 
SLB&M. Contains 1284.62 acres. 
3. Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor is the 
owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in 
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows: 
The south 257 acres of the east half of 
Section 33 and the south 513.75 acres of 
Section 34 and the south 514.50 acres of 
Section 35, less .73 acre reserved to State 
Road Commission of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
1284.50 acres. 
4. Defendants Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David 
L. Wright and Rona R. Wright are owners of certain real property 
located in Sections 3 and 10, R5E, T3N, SLB&M, Summit County, 
Utah. 
5. The Sawmill Canyon Road, as described by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of Olsen 
v. Papadopulos, begins at the frontage road to Interstate 80 in 
Echo Canyon in Section 10, Range 5 East, Township 3 North, SLB&M, 
and proceeds in a generally northerly direction crossing consecu-
tively the property of the Wright defendants, Charles F. Gillmor, 
Edward Leslie Gillmor and terminating on the property owned by 
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Shirley Gillmor at a point commonly known as "the forks" located 
in Section 28, R5E, T4N, SLB&M. There is access by four-wheel 
drive vehicle from the forks to the eastern portions of the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property by dirt roads. 
6. The Sawmill Canyon Road is a single lane dirt road 
located in the bottom of Sawmill Canyon, 
7. The Gillmor Sawmill Property was at one time owned 
in common by Florence Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Charles 
Frank Gillmor. It was partitioned by an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court dated February 14, 1981 in Civil No. 
223998. The partition decision was affirmed on appeal by the 
Utah Supreme Court in its opinion, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 
736 (Utah 1982). 
8. The property awarded to Florence Gillmor was 
subsequently conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his 
wife, Shirley Gillmor. Stephen T. Gillmor passed away in Febru-
ary, 1988 and, as of the trial of this action, the portion of the 
Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor was owned by Shirley 
Gillmor and Shirley Gillmor has been substituted for Stephen 
Gillmor as the plaintiff. 
9. Between September, 194 3 and December, 1986, the 
Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road, having been declared to be 
such in 1943 by the decision of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Summit County in the matter of Olsen v. Papadopulos. 
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10. The Gillmor family, for many years prior to 
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road to obtain access to 
their property for themselves, their employees and their guests 
to transport and tend livestock, to perform maintenance or 
construct improvements on the property, and for big game hunting 
by the family, employees and guests, but not including access for 
persons holding permits from the landowners to hunt big game. 
The road has historically carried a variety of vehicles including 
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles, 
and has been travelled by persons on foot and on horseback. 
11. During the years 1982 through 1986, Stephen 
Gillmor sold permits to allow persons to hunt big game on the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor, and some of 
those persons to whom permits were sold travelled in trucks to 
the Florence Gillmor Sawmill Property on the Sawmill Canyon Road 
and hunted big game there. 
12. At various times during the years 1982 through 
1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport hunters over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road because he was stopped from doing so by 
defendant Dennis Wright, who maintained that Stephen Gillmor did 
not have the right to transport paying hunters across the Wright 
property using the Sawmill Canyon Road. 
13. In 1986, Stephen Gillmor discovered the decision 
in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to Dennis Wright, who 
-6-
thereupon temporarily ceased his interference with Stephen 
Gillmor's use of the road. 
14. On December 24, 1986, at the request of the Wright 
defendants, the Summit County Commission formally abandoned the 
Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon defendant Dennis 
Wright reiterated the position of the Wright defendants that 
Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill Canyon Road to 
transport paying hunters across the Wright property. 
15. From 1982 through 1986, Stephen Gillmor used the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for access for his paying big game hunters, 
and would have used the road for such purpose on more occasions, 
but for the interference by Dennis Wright. 
16. The Gillmor Sawmill property has been designated 
by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1) Zone. 
17. The sale of big game permits by Stephen Gillmor 
and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a conditional use 
permit having been issued, was not a lawful use of the Sawmill 
Property during the years 1982 through 1986 because such activi-
ties violated the AG-1 zoning ordinance. 
18. While there was some minimal evidence of road 
damage by hunters, there is realistically no difference in the 
nature of the use of the road itself, whether the ultimate use of 
the various parcels is for commercial hunting, grazing or both. 
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19. There was also some minimal evidence that hunters 
are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle and sheep, but there 
was no sufficient showing that hunters' use of the road inter-
fered with the abutting owners* use of or access to their land. 
20. Plaintiff suffered damages of $10,943 dollars in 
revenues lost as a direct result of defendant Dennis Wright's 
interference with Stephen Gillmor's use of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road for access by hunters. 
21. Plaintiff and his agents, servants and hunters did 
not trespass upon property belonging to Charles Gillmor or Edward 
L. Gillmor. 
22. Plaintiff Stephen T. Gillmor and his agents and 
hunters did not create a nuisance. 
23. Plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the conduct 
of hunting operations. 
24. In its opinion on the appeal of the partition 
case, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that historical uses of 
property are not sacrosanct and that Edward Gillmor's ranching 
activities would be affected and curtailed and that it was 
appropriate that preservation of suitable grazing lands not be 
the primary consideration of the partitioning court and that the 
land as partitioned may be less useable for grazing. 
25. Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not have 
traditional grazing access to eastern portions of their Sawmill 
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parcels unless they are allowed access over parcels awarded to 
Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley Gillmor. 
26. Thirty-Five Canyon is not accessible for grazing 
from the south. Consequently, access over interveners' own land 
to eastern portions must be through Pine Canyon. Stock in 
limited numbers and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill 
Canyon Road through Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area. 
Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon is even more limited, 
difficult and treacherous. Herding stock through Pine Canyon 
then does not constitute traditional grazing access. This is 
consistent with the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second 
partition trial. Mr. Huffman did not even consider Pine Canyon 
for access. 
27. Earthmoving equipment cannot create a stock trail 
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access. The evidence 
did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be 
moved the length of Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's parcels 
to the eastern portions of intervenor's parcels in less than a 
full day. 
28. The trial court in the partition action did not 
intend to provide Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over 
parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor. 
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29. The difficulty of access to the eastern portions 
of the Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor parcels was addressed 
in testimony in the partition case. 
30. The source of the "mistake" in the partition 
decision alleged by Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor is Exhibit 
46-D (Exhibit 113D in the partition case). Exhibit 46-D was 
offered in the partition case by Charles Gillmor. Edward Gillmor 
failed to review Exhibit 46-D in the partition case and to move 
to strike it as he was expressly cautioned by the Court to do. 
31. Under such circumstances, it would be inappropri-
ate and unwise to invoke the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(7) 
to grant relief from the final judgment. This is a case where 
the finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight 
years after its entry and six years after its affirmance in 
response to assertions which suggest at the mostf "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect". 
32. An order granting an easement by implication or 
necessity would violate traditional notions of finality inherent 
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court 
now hereby makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road until 
its abandonment by Summit County on December 24, 1986, following 
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which the Sawmill Canyon Road was a private road. Plaintiff, as 
an abutting landowner, retained a right to use the road for any 
purpose for which it was lawfully used prior to abandonment in 
December, 1986. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon 
Road for access for herself, her family, agents, servants and 
guests for purposes related to the conduct of her ranching 
operation, for improvement or maintenance of the property, for 
recreation and similar uses consistent with the use of the road 
prior to December, 1986. 
3. Plaintiff is not entitled to use the Sawmill 
Canyon Road for access by paying hunters because use of the 
Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting by persons who had purchased 
permits, without a conditional use permit having been issued, was 
in violation of the AG-1 zoning ordinance and would, therefore, 
not be a lawful use of the property. 
4. Defendants are not liable for interfering with the 
use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by plaintiff for access by paying 
hunters. 
5. Plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to 
prevent interference by the Wright defendants with the use of the 
Sawmill Canyon Road for access by paying hunters. 
6. Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor are 
not entitled to modify the Decree of Partition in the partition 
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case, Civil No* 223998, to allow themselves access to their own 
Sawmill parcels by crossing plaintiff's parcel, nor are 
intervenor-defendants entitled to an easement by implication or 
necessity for such purpose. 
1. Plaintiff is not liable to intervenor-defendants 
for trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment or accounting. 
8. Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, should be 
dismissed with prejudice, 
9. The counterclaims of the intervenor-defendants, as 
amended, should be dismissed with prejudice. 
10. No costs are awarded. 
ENTERED th i. 17*. day of _i v ad, I 989. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
*bluJ2 Dated: ^>~ A^- V9 
JAMES B. LEE 
JOHN B ^ WILSON 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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Dated: 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Wright Defendants 
and Charles F. Gillmor 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 





I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT SHIRLEY GILLMOR to each of the following on this ^ ^ 
day of AjQy/fc/u-k.Cr , 1989: 
RICHARD C. SKEEN 
R. STEPHEN MARSHALL 
of and for 




Edward Leslie Gillmor 
50 So. Main St., Ste. 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
of and for 
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Wright 
Defendants-Respondents 
and Intervenor-Defendant-
Respondent Charles F. 
Gillmor 
72 East 400 South 
Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
219:080489A 
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